

OXFORD

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11 June 1971

SENIOR SEMINAR MASTER SCHEDULE

Block

Date

Pre-course session in late August

I The Senior Agency Officer Sun 19 Sept-Fri 24 Sept.

II The Intelligence Business Mon 27 Sept-Fri 1 Oct.

III Major World Trends: Their Significance for Policy and Intelligence Mon 4 Oct-Mon 18 Oct.

IV Covert Action: The Hidden Side of Foreign Policy Tues 19 Oct-Fri 22 Oct.

V CIA's Changing American Environment: Official and Public Tues 26 Oct-Thurs 4 Nov.

VI New Tools and Methodologies for Intelligence Fri 5 Nov-Tues 9 Nov.

TRIP

VII Management and Assessment of Intelligence in a Period of Change Mon 15 Nov-Wed 24 Nov.

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~~SECRET~~PROFILE OF SELECTED SENIOR OFFICERS

1. The Office of Personnel Control Division and the Office of Training Instructional Support Staff have provided data on the CIA senior officer population from which participants in the Senior Seminar will be selected. This population was defined as officers of grade GS-15 and higher who are 52 years of age or younger as of 1 July 1971. The data in the statistical "profile" concern those characteristics which are assumed to be significant in determining the objectives of the Seminar and in planning its content.

25X9

2. Career Service Distribution: As of 31 December 1970 there were [] officers in the population defined above. These were distributed by grade and by career service as shown in the following table:

FIGURE 1--DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED POPULATION

Grade	Total Agency	By Career Service					25X9
		E	I	D	S	R	
EP&SPS	[]						
GS-18							
GS-17							
GS-16							
GS-15							
Total	[]						

25X9

3. The [] senior officers comprising the selected population represent [] of the total number of Agency officers in grades GS-15 and above. The detailed breakdowns, by grade and career services, given in FIGURE 1 are expressed as percentages of comparable total Agency groupings by grade and career services, without regard to the age cutoff, in the following table:

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FIGURE 2--SELECTED POPULATION AS PERCENTAGE OF COMPARABLE TOTAL AGENCY POPULATION

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Total Agency</u>	<u>By Career Service</u>				
		<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
EP&SPS						
GS-18						
GS-17	25X9					
GS-16						
GS-15						25X9
Total						

4. Government Service: The average length of Federal service, including military service, and average length of CIA experience of the officers in the selected population are as follows:

FIGURE 3--LENGTH OF SERVICE

	<u>Agency Wide</u>	<u>By Career Service</u>				
		<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
Yrs. Federal Service	22	23	22	24	23	15
Yrs. Agency Service	17	17	18	20	19	9

5. Academic Degrees: The distribution of academic degrees, expressed in terms of the highest degree received by the officers in the population, is given in the next table:

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- 3 -FIGURE 4--ACADEMIC DEGREES

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<u>Degree Level Attained</u>	<u>Agency Wide</u>	By Career Service				
		<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
Bachelor						
Master						
Doctorate						
Non-degree						

6. Time Since Degree Awarded: The average time which has elapsed since degree-holding members of the population received their last degree is as follows:

FIGURE 5--TIME SINCE DEGREE

<u>Agency Wide</u>	By Career Service				
	<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
Average Years	20	17	19	22	18

7. Continuity of Agency Experience: The population was analyzed with respect to the continuity of assignments over the period 1960-1970. This analysis includes both the number of different Directorates (counting the Director's Area as a separate Directorate) and the number of different components--Offices, Divisions, and Staffs--in which each officer has served. The result of this analysis is as follows:

FIGURE 6--CONTINUITY AND VARIATION IN AGENCY EXPERIENCE

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<u>Directorate Service</u>	<u>Total Agency</u>	By Career Service				
		<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
Service in One						
Service in Two						
Service in Three						
Service in Four						

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FIGURE 6--CONTINUITY AND VARIATION IN AGENCY EXPERIENCE
(cont'd)

25X9

<u>Component Service</u>	<u>Total Agency</u>	<u>By Career Service</u>				
		<u>E</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>R</u>
Service in One						
Service in Two						
Service in Three						
Service in Four						
Service in Five or more						

8. Agency Sponsored Training: Attendance by officers in the population in external training programs or courses or in Agency courses of an advanced or senior character is shown as follows:

FIGURE 7--TRAINING

<u>Selected External Training</u>	<u>Total Agency</u>	<u>By Career Service</u>				
		<u>E</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>S</u>
National War College	28	2	10	5	5	6
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	20	-	4	3	4	9
Army War College	11	-	4	4	-	3
Naval War College	7	-	2	2	1	2
Air War College	9	-	2	3	-	4
Imperial Defence College	4	-	-	4	-	-
FSI Senior Seminar	16	-	10	6	-	-
Federal Executive Institute	11	-	-	7	1	3
Senior External Management Courses	65	1	6	19	9	30

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FIGURE 7 -- TRAINING
(cont'd)

<u>Selected Internal Training</u>	<u>Total Agency</u>	<u>By Career Service</u>				
		<u>E</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>S</u>
Advanced Intelligence Seminar	71	2	6	22	19	22
Managerial Grid (Includes Senior grid)	274	15	63	82	52	62
Mid-Career Course	155	6	30	56	25	38
Senior Management Seminar (pre-May 64)	20	1	3	11	2	3
Advance Management (Planning)	56	-	20	10	7	19
Senior Management Seminar Planning	78	1	16	20	20	21

9. General Profile: The statistical typical officer in the selected senior population is 47 years old and has 22 years of Federal service (including military service), of which 17 have been with CIA. Of ten representative officers in the group, five have received a bachelor's degree, three a master's, one a doctorate, and one is not a degree holder. For those who are degree holders, an average of 20 years has elapsed since the last degree was received; other academic course work not resulting in a degree may, however, have been taken during that period.

10. With respect to work experience in the Agency over the past 10 years, 74% have served in only one Directorate, 21% have had service in two Directorates, and the remaining 5% have worked in three or four Directorates. Agency service in terms of assignment to different components for the last 10 years is as follows: 41% served in only one component, 32% have had service in two components, 18% in three, and 9% in four or more different components. Eighteen percent of the population attended some Agency-sponsored senior external course or program. With respect to Agency-conducted courses, 30% of the population attended the Managerial Grid (exclusive of officers taking the Grid as part of the Mid-Career Course), 17% have attended a management course and 23% completed either the Mid-Career Course or the Advanced Intelligence Seminar.

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RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SENIOR SEMINAR

1. The justification of an Agency training program for its senior officers depends on whether senior officers are lacking in one or several important dimensions with respect to current or future Agency jobs which a properly designed course conducted by the Agency can effectively provide.

2. Training of new officers is primarily concerned with equipping them with intelligence and related job skills and with orienting them to the Agency and to the intelligence business. In contrast, the senior officer largely possesses, by virtue of his advancement through the ranks, the substantive knowledge and skills related to his particular job. The senior officer should be regarded as the expert insofar as the execution of his job is concerned, and a training program cannot add significantly, in a strict sense, to his job skills.

3. There is, of course, much more to being an effective senior officer in CIA than mastery over the content and skills needed for an assignment. For the senior officer to share effectively in the management of the Agency, he must have some understanding of the external pressures, internal problems, and other factors bearing on the decisions of top management. He should have insight into important Agency business and significant Agency relationships with the rest of government and outside groups which do not usually come within the immediate purview of his job. Such knowledge is a necessary ingredient in his own motivation and understanding of the Agency, as well as in his

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ability to interpret to his subordinates the decisions and actions of top management in such a way as to avoid parochialism. Security requirements and the tradition of compartmentation in our business have tended to carry over into this area and to limit the senior officers' grasp of relevant organizational matters. In the process of developing the Senior Seminar, a number of top Agency figures noted that most of our senior officers are wanting in their overall understanding of Agency management. This is a serious deficiency inasmuch as the senior officer group must be prepared to take on greater responsibilities over the next decade in the running of the Agency. Meeting this requirement identifies the first objective of the Senior Seminar.

Objective 1. To develop greater insight into problems and pressures facing CIA management, the processes of change within the Agency and in its external relationships, and developments in American society which are relevant to CIA as an organization.

4. The statistical profile of selected senior officers who may be candidates for the Senior Seminar is set out in Attachment ^B ~~A~~. Most of this group entered the Agency in the early 1950s. Personal experience in the events of World War II and the Cold War provided-- and in many cases continues to provide--a solid basis for personal and professional motivation in the work of the Agency. Apart from this direct experience, many senior officers acquired through academic training approximately two decades ago, their knowledge of U.S. relations with and interests in the foreign countries which are the

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collection, analysis and covert action targets of CIA. Many changes have occurred in U.S. foreign policy, in domestic factors bearing on policy, and in our intelligence targets, as well as in interpretive thinking on subjects related to intelligence and foreign policy. There is a need to update the knowledge of many senior officers on these areas of change.

Objective 2. To acquaint the participants with current thinking on U.S. foreign policy equities and developments abroad which are the subjects of CIA's business.

5. The occupational picture which emerges from the statistical profile is that of a group of officers which have grown accustomed to the pattern and regimen of Agency employment. In terms of age and experience, many are probably the victim of the "middle-aged" syndrome. Certainly for some, motivation and enthusiasm have been worn away or muted through long exposure to job routines and pressures. Perceptions and sensitivities toward other persons--peers as well as subordinates--have in varying degrees become dulled. Many senior supervisors cite difficulties in understanding and relating to younger officers. Thus, a large number of our senior officers would benefit from a pause in the work routine and exposure to an environment which provides a framework for self-renewal as well as learning.

Objective 3. To provide an opportunity for senior officers to renew their sense of personal motivation and appetite for achievement and to refresh and broaden their understanding and appreciation of "the other guy."

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6. The content of the Senior Seminar is designed to accomplish the objectives set forth above. The thematic unity of the Seminar is that of "learning" with respect to changes which are relevant to CIA and its senior officers' needs. These include current and future changes within the Agency, in the functioning of the U.S. intelligence effort, in the foreign targets which are the business of CIA, in CIA's relationships with the rest of government and its environment, and in the sense of individual self-renewal. External training programs can provide coverage of some subjects which are of particular interest to the Agency. Only a training experience focused on the intelligence profession, however, can cover various aspects of change which are relevant to the needs of the Agency's senior officer population.

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CIA SENIOR SEMINAR

DESCRIPTION

The Agency's first Senior Seminar will be conducted by the Office of Training from 19 September through 24 November 1971. As explained in the announcement issued by the Director of Training, attendance will be limited to twenty officers of minimum grade GS-15.

Pre-course Preparation: Upon completion of the nominating and selecting process, the officers chosen to attend the Seminar will be contacted by members of the Seminar faculty and invited to a half-day "pre-course" meeting during the second half of August. The pre-course session will include a presentation covering the total US foreign intelligence effort and a briefing on the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS).

At the conclusion of these briefings, the officers participating in the Seminar will be given a copy of the attached course outline and asked to respond to two questionnaires. One will request the officers to designate their selection of "Organizational Briefings" scheduled during BLOCK II. On the other questionnaire each participant will be asked to indicate their preferences for "Electives" proposed for each BLOCK and to designate out of all the Electives two for which they would be willing to act as a resource person in the Seminar by giving a paper, leading a discussion or taking part in a panel. Final selection of Organizational Briefings and Electives will be based on the needs and interests as expressed by the participants' responses. Resource person assignments will be worked out

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with the participants following the pre-course session as soon as practicable.

A copy of Wilensky's Organizational Intelligence will be distributed with the suggestion that this insightful work be read prior to the formal opening of the Seminar. The remainder of the pre-course session will be devoted to explaining the Seminar ground rules and answering participants' questions related to various Seminar activities, to the schedule, and so forth.

Plan of Study: Members of the Seminar will have an opportunity to discuss a variety of topics with leading authorities from the academic world and research organizations, officials from other government agencies, members of Congress, and knowledgeable officers from throughout the Agency. A limited amount of documentary material and articles from journals which are keyed to the different subjects covered in the Seminar will be available in the form of handouts and through the Office of Training library. As each participant is a senior officer who is expert in one or more fields, the Seminar will be conducted so as to maximize the opportunity for officers to learn from each other. In addition to serving as resource persons, each officer will be expected to participate actively and vigorously in all aspects of the Seminar--in discussions with outside speakers, team play, small group discussion, etc.

Another facet of active participation will be the Individual Presentation during which time each participant will have an opportunity to make a presentation to the Seminar on a topic of his choice.

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Subjects are to be based on personal experience or observation as an officer engaged in intelligence or related activities. The schedule will be managed entirely by the Seminar officers.

Each participating officer will be expected to play an active role in evaluating all aspects of the Seminar. A discussion will be held at the conclusion of each BLOCK which assesses speakers, selection of topics, formats of presentation, etc. and a general assessment of the Seminar will be held at its conclusion.

Location: The Seminar will open with one week at [redacted] in full-time residence. This environment should facilitate a break with office routine. The remainder, except for short visits "on location" and the BLOCK VII trip, will be conducted from new quarters in the [redacted].

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21 JUN 1971

SENIOR SEMINAR

OUTLINE OF CONTENT (Proposed)

(Scheduling of Subjects will be selected from the material outlined below)

BLOCK I: The Senior Intelligence Officer. The content of BLOCK I is designed to provide a series of fresh insights into the Agency and to stimulate interaction and active participation among Seminar officers. It is hoped that a pattern of active participation and forthright expression of views will develop during BLOCK I and be carried over throughout the remainder of the Seminar.

A. Orientation.

1. Welcome, administrative arrangements and codeword security briefings.

2. Participant Introductions. Each Seminar faculty member and participant will have a short period to introduce himself and briefly to describe his background. (Not to be confused with Individual Presentations.)

B. Current Perspectives of CIA. A series of talks by individuals or panels with different points of view who describe how they perceive our organization. These may include:

1. A senior officer and/or a seventh floor (top management) view.

2. How CIA appears to a distinguished alumnus or panel of alumni.

3. A knowledgeable outsider's appreciation of CIA.

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4. A panel of young professionals share their perceptions of the Agency.

C. Executive Workshops.

1. Management theory and practice. Leading spokesmen of several different leading schools of managerial behavior will discuss their theories and the results of research; as feasible, these may include participation in a workshop which demonstrates the particular approach.

2. Management cases. The Seminar will commence playing a series of case studies involving management problems, a number of which are constructed from Agency experience. Some of the cases will be played in other BLOCKS.

3. Stereotype Exercise. This exercise, played in small teams, is designed to demonstrate to Seminar officers how stereotyped thinking and attitudes within the Agency function as a barrier to cooperation across organizational lines.

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4 [redacted] shows a series of filmed interviews of persons whose careers he has followed. Seminar officers give their assessments of the persons being interviewed using rating scales provided by [redacted] He then critiques these assessments and shows a fuller picture of the subjects subsequent to the interviews. 25X1

5. Seminar Delphi. A Delphi exercise will be played by the Seminar officers; it will commence in BLOCK I and conclude in BLOCK VI with a report to the Seminar on the results and general discussion

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of the Delphi technique. The purpose is to acquaint the participants with a new technique for prediction and for assisting in the decision-making process.

6. Personal assessment workshop. (Optional) This activity is ~~not~~ related to the Agency's assessment program. Its purpose, rather, will be to help the individual officer to understand himself better--his strengths, aptitudes, potential interests, reactions, etc. in order to perceive himself and his career goals in a realistic light. The workshop consists of taking three tests: the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey "Profile of Values"; the Guildford-Zimmerman "Temperament Survey"; and the Strong "Vocational Interest Test." The tests will be scored and the results will be discussed with participants by a professional psychologist on an individual and confidential basis.

D. Elective Seminars.

1. Motivation in Intelligence Work or
2. How to Foster Creativity and Innovation in Intelligence Work.
3. Ways of Increasing the Work Involvement of Young Personnel in the Agency.
4. The CIA Executive as seen by the Secretary.
5. Drugs, Alcohol, and Mental Illness--how to recognize and what to do about it in CIA.

E. Evaluation of BLOCK I.

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BLOCK II: The Intelligence Business--Today and the Future. As described earlier, the pre-course session included a questionnaire asking the participants to identify intelligence activities which they would like to learn more about; these Orientation Briefings will be scheduled prior to the opening of the Seminar. The remainder of the BLOCK examines future intelligence trends and developments.

A. Orientation Briefings. (More than one may be conducted at a given time.)

1. Overhead Reconnaissance--The program and the organization; how program decisions are made; how the program is executed.

2. Exploitation of Imagery. A visit to NPIC. The exploitation process; support to collection systems; R&D in support of imagery exploitation.

3. R&D. Familiarization with various types of R&D performed by the Agency or through contractors in support of intelligence. Examples of developmental activity will be shown.

4. The SIGINT world in Defense. Briefings of how NSA and the SCA's function; ELINT and COMINT collection by Defense; techniques used and the product of the effort.

5. SIGINT activity conducted by the Agency. The work of the Office of ELINT. Third party and covert intercept activity. Collaboration with NSA. Support to other Agency operations.

6. Overt Collection. Current status of various types of overt intelligence collection and the uses of the material collected.

7. Technical support of Agent Operations. A TSD presenta-

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tion of support to the Clandestine Services- [redacted] 25X1
seals, mail operations, forgery, disguises, chemical analysis and
exploitation.

8. Counter-intelligence. Various types of CI operations and
their rationale; the relation of CI to FI and CA as seen from the
CI point of view; the role of the CI staff.

9. DIA. What DIA does directly and what it manages within
DOD: relation of DIA to military service^(INTELLIGENCE) and the intelligence activities of the unified and specified commands.

10. CIA Intelligence Production. The various types of finished
intelligence produced by the DDI and DDS&T with emphasis on the re-
lative value of different types of sources.

11. Intelligence requirements and evaluation. A look at the
photographic and SIGINT collection requirement systems; exploitation
requirements; human source requirements; evaluation of sources.

12. Communications. Briefing on the various types of support
performed by the Office of Communications.

13. Logistic Support. The CIA logistics system, using the
support related to Southeast Asia operations as a case example.

14. Intelligence Community. A look at the organization and
functioning of inter-agency coordination machinery, including the
USIB and its committees, the National Intelligence Resources Board,
and the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff.

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B. Significant Developments in the Business.

1. New Technical Systems. Review of developing and programmed technical systems which collect sensor data. The exploitation of these data and product derived from them. The contribution expected from them for filling gaps in our intelligence knowledge.

2. Impact of new systems on production and management. New collection systems may generate data in massive quantities without respect to "normal" working hours, and the time between collection and the provision of finished intelligence to the policy and decision maker will be greatly shortened. The effects of these changes in organizing exploitation and production, in personnel, facilities, etc. Their impact on management.

3. New technical intelligence problems. Speculation by a highly qualified observer as to potential new problems of a technical nature which US intelligence may be expected to address through the seventies.

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6. Intelligence Support to Policy Formulation. A key Agency official shares his insight into the way finished intelligence production is used by policy and decision makers. Examples of support. How policy makers express their needs for intelligence. How far intelligence should go.

C. Elective Seminars.

1. Agent Operations by the Military.
2. The Terrorist Left as Intelligence Target.
3. The Education of Consumer.
4. Assessment and Manipulation of Soviet Targets.
5. Scholarship and Open Sources.
6. The Task Force Approach.

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D. Films.

The Pueblo: A Question of Intelligence (to be researched further).

E. Evaluation of BLOCK II.

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BLOCK III: Major World Trends and Their Significance for Intelligence.

The objective of BLOCK III is to bring Seminar participants up to date on US National Security Policy and on a number of major problems and developments which affect both the policy level and intelligence work. Leading authorities from the academic community, research organizations, governmental policy-making agencies and CIA senior personnel will be invited to make individual presentations and participate in panel and group presentations.

A. The Global Background. An intelligence appreciation of current global power relationships; a projection of major international trends and probable developments over the next few years of particular interest to our national intelligence effort.

B. National Security Policy.

1. The Nixon Doctrine as explained by the policy maker. Its origins, main thrust and implications for US foreign policy, by a top policy maker.

2. A critique of the Nixon Doctrine in historical perspective, by a distinguished student of US foreign policy.

C. Relationships With the Other Super Power.

1. US-Soviet Relations--Continuing Challenge or Convergence. An analysis of US-Soviet relations as they have developed historically; myths and realities likely to affect the relationship in the 1970s.

2. The Strategic Balance. An analysis of its military and political meaning in the thermonuclear age; an intelligence appreciation of the forces and factors underlying the present situation, and

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indications for the future.

3. Military Factors in Foreign Policy Formulation. Strategic alternatives available to the U.S. in relation to the present and potential military threat as basic elements in the rational formulation of US foreign policy. The meshing of military with diplomatic, political, and economic foreign policy factors and objectives.

4. The Outlook for Arms Control and Disarmament. Prospects for the SALT talk; the future of non-proliferation; the implications of possible disarmament agreements for the US intelligence effort.

D. The Communist World.

1. The World through Moscow's Eyes. A Soviet official discusses Soviet views of US policy, power, and American life. (Special approval required.) An alternative would be to hear from a knowledgeable defector.

2. Inside the USSR. As the Soviets view themselves: the New Soviet Man; sources and significance of dissidence: the arts, science, youth, religion.

3. The Communist "Monolith" Today. A survey of relations among Communist countries and of Communist parties and activities around the world; factors of coherence and division -- Sino-Soviet differences, Castroism, the impact of nationalism, etc.

4. Communist China.

a. China and the Chinese background of the present regime. An analysis of the forces and leaders shaping contemporary China and a projection for the 1970s by a leading scholar.

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b. Chinese Communist Policy Trends. A look at recent developments in Chinese policy and perspective changes for the 1970s.

E. The Other X Billion.

2. Middle East -- Chronic Crisis. A policy perspective on the sources of conflict; the risks of the US-Soviet confrontation, and the prospects for managing the chronic crisis.

3. Latin America -- Backyard of the US. Political and social ferment south of the border. Implications for US military security and global political influence.

4. Western Europe -- Ally or Rival? Strengths and weaknesses of the area and of the trans-Atlantic relationships; factors bearing on its future development and direction.

F. Global Problems.

1. The Technology Explosion. A broad-brush examination of technological changes and their relation to US foreign policy objectives.

2. Population. Discussion of demographic and related developments which impact on the pursuit of US foreign policy goals.

3. World Wide Political Trends. A review of major political ideologies and trends, including nationalism, communism, and the new left, which bear on the conduct of international relations in the 1970s.

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G. Elective Seminars.

1. The Soviet Leadership as seen by Analyst and Operator.
2. The Nixon Policies: Their Implications for Intelligence.
3. India Through the Seventies.
4. US Policy Options in Southeast Asia or
5. The Implications of Vietnam for CIA.
6. Sino-Soviet Conflict.
7. The Subsahara - Coexistence or Chaos?
8. Understanding Foreign Cultures.
9. The World-wide Development of a Counter-Culture.
10. Counterinsurgency Today.

H. Films.

1. Gates of Heaven.
2. China--Roots of Madness.
3. One or two on the USSR.
4. "The River" or "Pather Panchali" (India)

I. Evaluation of BLOCK III.

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BLOCK V: The Changing Environment of CIA. This BLOCK takes a fresh look at several of the more significant external forces and environments--both official and unofficial--which influence the functioning of the Agency. The specific objective of this BLOCK is to provide Seminar officers with an opportunity to become acquainted with the problems posed for top management by external pressures, attitudes and developments, and to provide officers with an appreciation for how CIA is faring within these external environments.

Among the "official environments" which will be considered are the national security policy-making elements of the Executive Branch which the Agency supports through the production of intelligence and from which it receives policy direction and control. Another environment to be covered is the Agency's relationships with the US Congress. (The relationships within the Intelligence Community were previously considered in BLOCK II.)

The unofficial or "domestic environment" also influences our organization. Thus, attention will be focused on CIA's "attentive publics" and on social and cultural trends developing within the US which impact on Agency's interests.

A. Key CIA Relationships in the Executive Branch.

1. The NSC. A visit to the White House Situation Room to be briefed on the NSC structure and to hear from a NSC spokesman concerning points of contact with and support provided by the Agency. (Special approval to be requested)

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2. PFIAB and/or OMB. While in the Executive Office area, the Seminar will visit these two important sources of staff advice to the President in intelligence matters. A spokesman for each will delineate their respective roles vis-a-vis intelligence activities.

3. Department of State. The Seminar will hear from a knowledgeable official(s) on the subject of the Department's dealings with the Agency at the Headquarter's level and in the field.

4. Department of Defense. An official(s) will discuss various points of contact between the Department and the Agency.

B. The Congress. The Seminar faculty will work with the Legislative Counsel to develop a "Day on the Hill" during which different members of Congress and key congressional staffers will be invited to discuss the work of the Congress, intelligence, current national issues, or other topics as may be appropriate.

C. Domestic Change of Relevance to CIA.

1. Social and Cultural Trends in American Society. One or more leading authorities on the subject will be invited to identify these trends and to discuss likely developments during the remainder of the 1970s which may affect Agency interests.

2. Changing National Priorities and Goals. An outside authority will discuss recent developments and pressures for the reallocation of public resources among various program areas. He will be invited to speculate on the implications of these developments for the continuing support of national intelligence programs.

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3. "CIA's Attentive Publics." Spokesmen of different sectors of public opinion will be invited to discuss their views of CIA and US intelligence. These outsiders may include critics of the Agency as well as friends from among the press, youth, the academic and business communities.

D. Elective Seminars.

1. CIA Participation in an Interdepartmental Group.
2. The Informal Position of CIA today in the Federal Establishment.
3. The Agency's Image and Public Understanding.
4. The Impact of Domestic Problems on Foreign Policy.
5. How does the New Youth Culture in the US Affect CIA?

E. Films.

Selling of The Pentagon(CBS). (To be researched further.)

F. Evaluation of BLOCK V.

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BLOCK VI: New Tools of Interest to Intelligence. This BLOCK is designed to provide Seminar officers with a broad-brush acquaintance with new methodologies and tools which may have application to various phases of Agency work. The subject matter will be presented in non-technical terms readily understandable to the layman. Senior officers who develop a particular interest in one or another approach will be able to follow up their interest in more depth by consulting resources identified by the speakers.

A. Long-Range Projecting. A new approach for projecting and modeling scenarios of various "futures"--technical, demographic, economic--known as "Futurism." This work, which is taking on significance in current US thinking and planning, has potential application to some phases of Agency work, e.g., long-range estimating and operational planning.

1. Futurism: A Developing Technique. A leading participant(s) from the ranks of those active in "Futurism" will discuss methodologies for long-range prediction, types of choices and present several models of Futures.

2. An "Apocalyptic Model." A look at the intelligence business in the next decade using the approach of a Futures model.

3. Seminar Delphi. The results of the Seminar Delphi commenced in BLOCK I will be made available. The Delphi technique, its uses and limitations, will be discussed.

4. Delphi Use in Intelligence Forecasting. The experience secured in a recent extensive application of the Delphi technique to a complex problem of intelligence analysis and estimating will be outlined to the Seminar.

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B. The Think-Tank as Intelligence Organization. The publications issued by research organizations, such as RAND, indicate that one of their functions is to produce intelligence. A member of a research organization who knows the intelligence business will discuss similarities and differences between the two and how the think-tanks can assist intelligence organizations.

C. Other Methodologies. A practitioner(s) in the Agency will tell how methodologies such as operations research, systems analysis and quantitative decision-making have been applied to intelligence problems.

D. Elective Seminars.

1. A Recent Look at Early Warning.
2. Examination of Some Intelligence "Failures."

E. Evaluation of BLOCK V.

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BLOCK VII: TRIP. Seminar officers may select one or more places to visit during the period in the schedule set aside for a trip, depending on their interest and relevance to their jobs. A list of possibilities will be developed including Agency, other intelligence or intelligence contractors, military command and control and space facilities, and locations associated with domestic developments. Specific arrangements will be worked out at the beginning of the Seminar. Those not interested in such a visit may continue to work on a special paper or presentation, or pay a visit to their "opposite numbers."

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BLOCK VIII: Management of Intelligence. This BLOCK concludes the Seminar with an examination of the processes of managing intelligence, and an assessment and stock taking of the Agency's current posture and future directions. The subject matter, particularly the Executives, is meant to encourage Seminar officers to think ahead and to reflect on how we can do a better job and help to make the Agency a more effective organization.

A. Management of Personnel and Resources.

1. Personnel Problems and Planning. A senior Agency officer will identify current personnel problems and discuss recent efforts by the Agency to plan for the movement of officers into senior positions throughout the Agency as the "founding fathers" due to retire during the next decade.

2. Intelligence Priorities and Resource Allocation. A panel of Agency officers will examine the current set of priorities among Agency activities and discuss the allocation of financial and personnel resources in the light of these priorities. The panel will speculate on what they see in these areas over the next several years.

3. The Soviet Military as a Resource Problem. At present, a preponderance of the US intelligence effort is targeted against the Soviet military establishment. Some students of the subject hold the view that a disproportionate part of the effort is devoted to this subject. This thesis will be examined.

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B. Some Reflections on the Intelligence Business.

1. The Separation of Intelligence from Policy Formulation.

Objectivity is a primary goal in the intelligence work of the Agency. Serious efforts have been made to maintain this objectivity and to institutionalize the separation between intelligence and policy-making processes of the government. In some areas this barrier is being weakened. Knowledgeable officers will discuss this trend and speculate as to future developments in maintaining the independence of intelligence from the formulation of policy.

2. Cultural and Psychological Factors which Influence Analysis.

The dominant cultural ethic in the Agency is a liberal humanism developed in the light of the post World War I period, the depression, World War II and the Cold War. This general cultural framework underlies and conditions how our analysts tend to interpret various world developments. A related aspect is the problem of cross-cultural perception involved in understanding the motivations, intentions and actions of governments of countries having dissimilar cultures. An effort will be made to place these factors which influence our outlook in perspective.

3. The Role of Intelligence in American Society. The Director's recent speech to the newspaper editors provides an excellent basis for discussing the subject of reconciling secrecy required in intelligence work with traditional American views.

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C. Elective Seminars.

1. Duplication in the Intelligence Community.
2. The DCI's Community Hat or
3. Erosion of the DCI/CIA Special Authorities.
4. CIA Career Services - Tool or Obstacle.
5. How can we best use and manage Young Professionals in the Future?

6. Values, Job Satisfaction and the Senior Officer.
7. Inspection: Process of Management.
8. Is a Truly Clandestine Service Possible?
9. Control vs. Innovation: Are we Becoming too

~~SECRET~~ Bureaucratic?

10. Has Intelligence Been Oversold?
11. CIA as Employer: A Comparison.
12. The Psychological Contract with CIA.

D. Evaluation of BLOCK VIII.

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WHO SHOULD ATTEND THE SENIOR SEMINAR?

1. A frequent comment on the new Seminar is that its value to the Agency will depend on the selection of qualified participants. Such officers are usually thought of in terms of organizational "comers." It is essential that the Seminar have some outstanding officers--at least one from each Directorate--who can function as pace-setters and will take the lead in interpreting the work of their Directorate to the officers from other Directorates. The balance of the Seminar, however, should be composed of representative, capable senior officers, as it cannot afford any participants who no longer have a capacity for learning or broadening themselves with respect to his chosen profession or who has no prospect of a challenging assignment.

2. A good mixture of officers is extremely important in order to enable the participants to learn from each other. A representative group would include some officers with different geographic knowledge about or ~~has~~ ^{have} served in the USSR, mainland China, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Latin America. As feasible, other areas might also be represented. Similarly, officers with different Agency functional specialties should be represented, such as clandestine operations officers, technical operations support, political analyst, scientific and technical analyst, economist, military analyst, geographer, lawyer, signals intelligence, photographic and other technical intelligence specialists, support specialists and officers with backgrounds in general administration. In many cases, an officer

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would combine both a functional specialty with a desired geographic background.

3. The selection process should be designed so as to provide a wide mixture of geographic and functional specialties. It would, therefore, be most desirable for the total number of nominations from Directorates to be considerably larger--perhaps twice as large--as the twenty officers who will be attending the Seminar. Responsibility for final selection in order to attain a balanced group with varying backgrounds and skills would then be exercised by the Training Selection Board.

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